In early 2004, the U.S. Government initiated the Medicare Discount Drug Card Program (MDDCP), which created a market for drug cards that allowed elderly and handicapped subscribers to obtain discounts on their prescription drug purchases. Pharmacy-level prices for many drugs were posted on the program website weekly from May 29, 2004 to December 31, 2005, as the largest undertaking in the history of government-sponsored information release began with the hope of promoting competition by facilitating access to prices. A large panel of pharmacy-level drug price data collected from the Medicare website indicates that there was signi…cant and persistent dispersion in prices across cards throughout the program. Moreover, the time-path of prices was non-monotonic; the prices declined initially when consumers were choosing cards but rose later when subscribers were unable to switch from one card to another. In contrast, contemporaneous control prices from on-line drug retailers, which were unrelated to the program, rose steadily over time, indicating that MDDCP prices evolved in a way di¤erent from the general evolution of prices outside the program. In view of the fact that the program rules prevented consumers from changing their cards at will, the evolution of MDDCP prices is consistent with certain models of dynamic price competition with consumer switching costs, such as Klemperer's (1987a,b). Estimates of potential savings from purchasing at program prices are also provided.
The MDDCP and its successor program, Medicare Part D, were supposed to induce competition among drug companies, largely through the extensive price information that intermediary drug card sponsors were required to post on the Medicare website. As a source of pressure to lower prices, intense competition among drug cards was to replace the bargaining power that Medicare had previously used directly with the drug companies. Under terms of the MDDCP and its Part D successor, Medicare is no longer allowed to exercise its bargaining power in this way. But at the same time the MDDCP generated price information to support competition among drug cards, the program design also required that subscribers commit to a single drug card once they subscribed, rather than switch cards at will. This institutional constraint on consumer switching could in principle act to inhibit competition by introducing prohibitively high switching costs. Thus, a major question is whether MDDCP competition among the drug-card sponsors was indeed e¤ective in lowering drug prices as intended.
Using a large sample of prices collected from the MDDCP website during several weeks of the program, this paper studies the e¤ects of the release of price information on the functioning of the prescription drug market that was created under the program. In particular, we focus on the e¤ect of the release of on-line information about physical market prices on the evolution of prices in physical markets. Our approach is to analyze the change in level and dispersion of prices after the MDDCP price information became available to consumers on the Medicare website, and to compare price levels with non-MDDCP drug prices for identi…cation of program e¤ects. We use the data to understand the extent and determinants of price dispersion within the program and to investigate the dynamics of prices over the course of the program.
The empirical analysis indicates that the program did not bring convergent prices for drugs, but instead resulted in signi…cant dispersion in prices across drug cards. There was no obvious trend of convergence in prices across drug cards. More importantly, the evidence also points to a non-monotonic time-path for prices. The prices tended to decline initially in the early phases of the program when card subscription was still di¤using across consumers, and they rose later when card subscription was mostly complete and consumers could no longer switch cards, although the magnitudes of these trends in prices were not exceptionally large relative to the average of prices at the beginning of the program.
Control prices unrelated to the program were collected contemporaneously from on-line drug retailers, and these control prices exhibited a steady upward trend throughout the MDDCP. In particular, when MDDCP prices declined, on-line prices rose, and when both sets of prices rose, the rise in MDDCP prices was actually greater than the rise in on-line prices. Thus, MDDCP prices evolved di¤erently from the general evolution of prices outside the MDDCP. The time-path of prices within the MDDCP cannot be simply explained away by general trends in drug prices. Program-speci…c e¤ects were important.
We also use non-program nationwide average prices that were typically used to reimburse patients to provide estimates of savings card users could obtain, excluding the enrollment fee. The estimates suggest that there were some savings to naïve consumers, i.e. those consumers who do not engage in vigorous search and simply buy randomly from a seller both under the regular prices and under the program. The savings were almost twice as large for searching consumers who can locate the card with the minimum price using the program's search engine, but otherwise buy randomly from a seller in the regular market. Naïve consumers, however, could actually save more by purchasing from on-line retailers at non-program prices instead of purchasing using cards in the MDDCP.
Certain models of consumer search and access to price information, such as that of Stahl (1994) , predict that prices decline monotonically as the fraction of consumers informed about prices increases.
Such a monotonic decline does not emerge in our sample. While prices declined early in the program, they tended to rise later on. The observed time-path of prices appears to be consistent with an environment where the switching costs are high. Some dynamic models of price competition with consumer switching costs, such as that of Klemperer (1987a,b) , can account for the type of price dynamics observed here. Anticipation of the fact that consumers would be stuck with their choices escalates competition earlier on to attract and lock-in consumers, leading to lower prices initially but higher prices later on. We elaborate further on the relevance of dynamic price competition models with consumer switching costs below.
It is important to emphasize that the analysis in this paper is not a "before-and-after"comparison of the evolution of prices, simply because no "before"is available; the cards did not exist before prices were released on the Medicare website. Therefore, the analysis here cannot be classi…ed under the general class of studies comparing the behavior of data with and without treatment, where identi…cation comes from the presence of the treatment. Rather, the strategy followed here is to monitor the changes in prices over time starting with the initial on-line release of prices and to compare the evolution with that of a contemporaneous control group. Several reasons, discussed below, suggest that prices were likely to change gradually over time, and the important question is how any change in prices can be attributed to the program's environment. As mentioned earlier, we rely on non-program drug prices posted by on-line drug retailers as controls for general movements in drug prices, to identify and isolate changes in program prices due to program-speci…c e¤ects. On-line prices are unlikely to be a¤ected by the price choices made by cards within the MDDCP, because the program is applicable to a relatively small fraction of the overall population of prescription drug users. 1 This paper is related to a growing literature that analyzes the role of better consumer price in- 1 The estimated target population by this program was about 7.5 million people under Medicare.
formation on the functioning of markets (see, e.g., Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) , Brown and Goolsbee (2000) , Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) , and Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2005)). The paper, however, di¤ers from the rest of this literature in a number of important ways. First, the availability of a large amount of high-frequency (weekly) price data both across geography and over time allows us to make a more comprehensive analysis than previous studies. Second, most studies -with the exception of Brown and Goolsbee (2000) -only document the e¤ect of search on the Internet on on-line prices.
Instead, we are able to focus on the response of prices in the traditional market to the release of price information on the Internet. In addition, under the MDDCP the release of price information is mandatory, not voluntary, and it is exhaustive and covers all prices, rather than being limited to a selected subset of all prices as is the case with most price search engines on the Internet. 2 Third, institutional aspects of the program, discussed in detail below, open the way for non-monotonic evolution of prices, which is evident in the data. Such non-monotonicity is not expected when only the improved price information for consumers is the primary driver of prices. Additional constraints of the program seem to matter. In particular, the switching costs erected by the program are very likely to be responsible for the type of dynamics observed, as predicted by models in the spirit of Klemperer (1987a,b) . Finally, this study has a policy relevance with potentially large welfare consequences. The design of a viable prescription drug program for elderly is still a major policy issue and the success of Medicare Part D remains to be seen. The analysis here provides evidence about the e¤ectiveness of a government-sponsored program by analyzing the role of government-initiated release of information on the functioning of the resulting prescription drug market. The results are therefore valuable for understanding the e¤ects of public information policy and for assessing the future of Medicare Drug policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some background for the MDDCP. Section 3 presents our theoretical motivation, based on literature for markets with imperfect information and switching costs. Section 4 describes the data. Empirical analysis and results are in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The MDDCP Background
The design and the institutional environment of the MDDCP are crucial for understanding the functioning of the retail drug markets that were created by the program. The MDDCP allowed quali…ed drug-card sponsors to make arrangements with drug manufacturers to obtain discounts and pass the discounts on to Medicare recipients. Eligible consumers could then strictly voluntarily subscribe to a card of their choice and obtain their prescriptions at a discount speci…ed by the card sponsor, either from retail pharmacies or by mail from mail-order pharmacies that have arrangements with the card sponsor. To subscribe to a card, a consumer had to pay a …xed annual fee (for at most two years), ranging between $0 and at most $30, and thereafter was entitled to receive that drug-card sponsor's discounts on all the drugs that sponsor covered. A consumer's problem was thus to choose both the 2 Internet search engines have their own practices and some charge …rms to be included in the results of a price search by consumers. See, e.g., Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2005) for more on the economics of price search engines. drug card and the retail (or mail-order) pharmacy that provided the best discount on the bundle of drugs used by the consumer. The price information released on the Medicare website was designed to facilitate the process of searching for cards and pharmacies, so consumers could …nd the best deals on their bundles of drugs.
Institutional aspects of the program were critical in shaping the dynamics of program prices. First, a card sponsor was not required to commit to a given level of discount on drugs over time, but instead could change its prices at any time without notice. This ‡exibility in card prices left the door open for price ‡uctuations that could result from competition among cards, above and beyond general ‡uctuations in drug prices, such as those due to changes in manufacturers'costs or changes in demand due to the introduction of a generic version of a drug. Similar ‡exibility was applicable to individual pharmacies. For a given card, there was also no prior commitment for the prices to be the same across all pharmacies that o¤ered discounts under the card. Thus, prices could potentially have evolved di¤erently in di¤erent pharmacies and locations.
Second, in addition to the usual consumer search and switching costs that contribute to price dispersion in drug retail markets (see, e.g., Sorensen (2000 Sorensen ( , 2001 , Scott-Morton (1997)), prohibitive consumer switching costs were erected by the very design of the program. 3 Once enrolled in a card program, a consumer was not allowed to switch to another card, except in certain special cases, such as when a consumer moves to a new location or if a card sponsor exited from the market. This restriction on switching introduced additional friction and inertia into the market, which may have impeded reallocation of consumers to low price card sponsors over time. The MDDCP had a nationally coordinated switching period between November 15 and December 31, 2004, during which consumers were allowed to review their card choices and change them if they wished to do so. After this period, which covered a window before a full year of the program, a consumer who is already enrolled in a card was not allowed to switch to another card until the program terminated at the end of 2005, subject to the exceptions mentioned. The prevention of switching after the switching period expired and the timing of the switching period, could potentially lead to price dynamics driven by card sponsors' incentives to charge lower prices in the early stages of the program in order to attract subscribers, and then to increase their prices once consumers were locked in to their card choices.
Third, the di¤usion of card enrollment among eligible consumers was expected to be gradual over time, not instantaneously. Related is the rate of the di¤usion of price search by consumers on the program's website. The enrollment was strictly voluntary and consumers had to evaluate card choices before making a decision. One of the main criticisms of the MDDCP was the complexity of the card-choice process, due to an abundance of alternative plans whose bene…ts were hard to assess.
This criticism applies equally to Medicare Part D, which began in January, 2006. Adding to this complexity concern is the fact that most consumers eligible for cards were 65 years or older, not a group of particularly Internet-savvy consumers, although their general Internet usage rate has been rising over time. 3 Usual switching costs in the context of prescription drugs include consumer learning costs about the side e¤ects of a new drug that can substitute for the consumer's existing drug and physicians'inertia in changing a prescription due to rewards and loyalty programs o¤ered by the manufacturer or the wholesaler of that drug.
Before the program went into e¤ect, Fox (2004) estimated that 22 percent of adults aged 65 and older had access to the Internet. Of this group, an estimated 66 percent used the Internet to locate health information, implying that about 14% of the relevant population used the Internet for health information search. While these rates are not very high, they cannot be taken as de…nitive …gures for predicting the di¤usion of price search under the MDDCP, because the program clearly gave incentives for price comparison by promising discounts, making it di¤erent from casual health information search or ordinary drug price search on the Internet. Therefore, the rate of di¤usion could actually have been higher within the group of individuals eligible for the program. Some elderly, especially if cognitively handicapped, also relied on agents such as relatives or care-givers to guide them through the subscription process. Furthermore, some cards actually had subscription assistance programs, which helped elderly citizens choose the best options for them. From a theoretical standpoint, the critical mass of searching consumers needed to induce escalated competition among …rms may correspond to very low actual fractions of consumers who search. While we do not have total enrollment data for the MDDCP, recent evidence on the di¤usion of Medicare Part D suggests that about 90 percent coverage of the people 65 and older was achieved within the …rst 6 months from the start of the program in January 2006. 4 Further evidence on consumers'enrollment and experience with the program comes from an October 2005 report on the progress of the MDDCP program prepared by Abt Associates, Inc. upon request from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 5 Based on an extensive survey of card enrollees and non-enrollees, the report found that wide-spread awareness of the MDDCP was obtained within a few months of the program, mostly in the spring of 2004. Therefore, non-enrollment due to lack of information about the program can be ruled out. A majority of the respondents reported that they had more than enough information to make a choice among the cards, but about one quarter to half of them did not consider more than just one drug card. Some of these consumers were simply ignorant about card choice and took the …rst card that came their way, while others were auto-enrolled by their State Pharmacy Assistance Programs or had their enrollment facilitated by the Center for Medicaid Studies. Pharmacists played a key role in helping consumers choose a card in their best interests.
Of more importance are estimates of the intensity of search for program price information on the program website. The report reveals that about 13 percent of survey participants obtained information from the Medicare website, either directly or with the help of a family member, friend or counselor who accessed the website for them. Not too surprisingly, website usage rate was highest among people eligible for Medicare due to disability and those who were younger and may therefore be more comfortable with computer and Internet use. Many of those who accessed the website were enthusiastic about it and found the information they were looking for, while some found the website confusing due to the large number of card options listed. A major reason survey respondents gave for choosing a card was that the card could be used at their pharmacy of choice. Cost of card ownership was also an important consideration. About a third of the respondents said they paid less with the card they chose compared with other cards, and that the annual enrollment fee for their chosen card was acceptable to them. Some consumers simply opted for a free card, i.e. one with no annual fee, reasoning that they had nothing to lose.
Overall, the available evidence suggests that the Medicare website and the price information posted on the website were indeed utilized to some extent in making decisions, either directly by consumers or indirectly through the assistance of others. However, given that the search rates were not impressively large, whether the di¤usion of enrollment and access to price information was enough to make any changes in prices is an empirical issue. We also note that card sponsors had to set their prices without perfect information on the extent of consumer search for lower prices. Therefore, even though the consumer search rates were not too high, card sponsors might have lowered their prices to attract consumers in the absence of perfect information on the extent of price search. Next, we consider the theoretical arguments that can shed light on what to expect in terms of the evolution of prices.
Theoretical considerations
Consumer search is an important source of price dispersion in retail drug markets (e.g. Sorensen (2000, 2001) ). Our focus is on the implications of models of consumer search and better access to price information on …rms'pricing behavior, subject to the institutional aspects of the program. While essentially static models of search are abundant in the literature (see, e.g., Salop and Stiglitz (1977) , Reinganum (1979) , Burdett and Judd (1983) , Stahl (1989) ), a dynamic approach is most relevant for our purposes, because we are not only interested in the static price dispersion in the market created by the discount drug card program, but also in how prices evolve over time as switching costs change.
The central question is what happens as card subscription di¤uses over time and as subscribers use price information on the program website to search for lower prices for their prescriptions, subject to the institutional constraints of the program. In a static model of oligopolistic competition, where a consumer is either completely uninformed of prices or fully informed, Stahl (1989) shows that as the fraction of consumers who are informed increases, average price falls monotonically. However, price dispersion exhibits non-monotonic behavior with respect to that fraction, initially increasing for low values of the informed fraction, but decreasing for higher values. While comparative statics from this static model can be used, as in Brown and Goolsbee (2000) , to draw some conclusions for an essentially dynamic framework, the MDDCP's institutional environment introduces further considerations for …rms'and consumer's dynamic behavior.
As discussed in the previous section, a major constraint of the program is that it prevents consumers from using more than one card, or from changing their card choices after they subscribe, with few exceptions. After the initial enrollment period, there was a period of no switching and then the November-December 2004 switching period, which fell roughly into the middle of the MDDCP and allowed consumers to change their cards if they wished to do so. After the switching period, consumers could not change their card choices till the termination of the program. As long as consumer search for lower prices was e¤ective, the prohibitive switching cost could have induced card sponsors to compete intensely in the early stages of the program to attract consumers who had not yet chosen a card.
Such competition could bring lower prices. But as more and more consumers got locked in to their choices, card sponsors would have incentive to raise prices. So after the switching period, prices may be expected to rise as sponsors take advantage of consumers'inability to change cards. Overall, then, the environment of the program could result in prices falling …rst during the early stages where enrollment continued, possibly rising later until the switching period, falling again during the switching period, and once again rising thereafter.
The conjectured time-path of prices can indeed arise in certain models of dynamic price competition with consumer switching costs, such as those of Klemperer (1987a,b) and Farrell and Shapiro (1989) in a two-period framework and that of Beggs and Klemperer (1992) in a multi-period framework. 6 Because the MDDCP had a life-time of less than two years, …nite-horizon versions of these models are more appropriate. Furthermore, cards are di¤erentiated in many dimensions, so a di¤erentiated-products approach is reasonable. Klemperer (1987a) o¤ers exactly this type of framework, which features a two-period di¤erentiated-products duopoly in which consumers are partially "locked in" by switching costs that they face in the second period. These switching costs make demand more inelastic in the second period. Perhaps less obviously, they also do so in the …rst period, because consumers recognize that a …rm with a higher market share in the …rst period charges a higher price in the second period, and hence they are less inclined to purchase from that …rm in the …rst period. Prices are lower in the …rst period as …rms compete to build a customer base that is valuable later. However, prices may be higher in both periods than they would be in a market without switching costs. Klemperer (1987b) has similar …ndings, but in a homogeneous product case. Theoretically, the MDDCP erected in…nitely large switching costs, so we expect the price e¤ects outlined above to be pronounced.
There are two main considerations under MDDCP that can make the price dynamics di¤erent than in Klemperer (1987b) . First, Klemperer (1987b) assumes perfect consumer information about prices, whereas some card enrollees under MDDCP chose their drugs under imperfect information about prices, according to the available evidence. Lack of perfect information about prices would not change the competition in the second period of these models, because the constraints on switching would prevent consumers from abandoning their …rms even if they were informed of a lower price at some point. However, the intensity of competition in the …rst period could change. Firms could take advantage of consumers' imperfect information and not lower their prices as much as they would in the case of perfect information in Klemperer (1987b) . Nevertheless, if a critical mass of consumers searches, even with imperfect information we would still expect to see lower prices in the …rst period.
Second, there is no arti…cially introduced "switching period" in Klemperer (1987b) . The MDDCP's allowance for a round of card-switching in the middle of the program creates incentives for a price war by card sponsors. An implication is that, in addition to lower prices at the early phases of the program, we expect to see lower prices during the switching period, compared to non-switching periods.
Certain considerations, however, may have prevented the predicted non-monotonic path for prices.
Given the continuing nature of the prescription drug program with Part D, card sponsors who use bait-and-switch strategies could su¤er harm to their reputations. While the MDDCP itself lasted only 6 For more references to the literature on dynamic competition with switching costs, see Beggs and Klemperer (1992) . two years, many of the card sponsors continued on to participate in Medicare Part D when it started in January 2006, so sponsors had to also consider the possibility of alienating consumers because of baitand-switch price strategies. One of the program's goals, as stated in the Medicare's program-related website, was to monitor prices and prevent bait-and-switch behavior. However, the program did not spell out any strict guidelines as to what exactly constitutes bait-and-switch and there appeared to be little enforcement to prevent such behavior. In addition, the nationally co-ordinated switching period gave all card sponsors a clear incentive to reduce their prices and raise them thereafter. If many sponsors engage in a price reduction during that period and raise their prices later, it is hard to single out a sponsor's pricing behavior and label it "deviant".
The discussion so far suggests that the level of program prices may not have declined steadily over time but instead could fall in switching periods and rise in non-switching periods. What about the dispersion of prices? As mentioned earlier, we expect a decline in the dispersion of prices under many models of consumer search with homogenous products. One reason such convergence in prices might not occur here is the heterogeneity of the drug cards. While all cards promised discounts, their geographic coverage, drug coverage (formulary), and eligibility criteria di¤ered to some extent. As a result, it is possible that di¤erent cards ended up serving distinct or at least partially overlapping consumer segments, e¤ectively resulting in a market with di¤erentiated products. In addition, the complexity of the card choice process and the abundance of alternatives, coupled with some evidence that price search was not very intense, may also prevent a strong convergence in prices. Switching costs can also prevent prices from converging over time. When consumers get locked in to their choices, each card could charge its own preferred price for a drug, which is not likely to be identical across cards due to product di¤erentiation.
In summary, in view of the institutional environment of the program and the predictions arising from models of dynamic competition with switching costs, we expect to observe a non-monotonic path for prices. However, the degree of initial decline and subsequent rise in prices, the exact timing and duration of each episode, and the change in the dispersion of prices all depend on the underlying fundamentals, and the pattern the program prices will follow is ultimately an empirical issue.
Data
In this section we describe the drugs for which data were collected, the geographic areas covered, the timing of data collection, and the other prices that were obtained for control purposes.
Drugs
Prices were collected for 28 prescription drugs, which were chosen based on the following three criteria. First, all the drugs were in the top 100 drugs in claims …led by the elderly in 2001, and in the top 200 highest selling drugs for the elderly in 2003. This selection of relatively popular drugs ensures that each drug had su¢ ciently large demand and also was supplied by many cards. In fact, all cards supplied all 28 drugs in our sample. The relatively high demand for these drugs implies that the price dynamics we look for are likely to have been apparent and economically important for these drugs, compared to obscure drugs that are demanded less. Second, half of the drugs are short-term drugs, such as antibiotics and pain killers, and the other half are long-term, maintenance drugs, such as those used for diabetes and cardiovascular diseases. The evolution of short-term drug prices is expected to be di¤erent from that of maintenance drugs, for which consumers are likely to search more intensely for a bargain. Finally, drug dosages were selected to re ‡ect the most frequently prescribed dosages for the drugs, so that the demand is large relative to what would be in the cases with unusually high or low dosages. 7 Each drug price pertains to a 30-day supply of the drug. The drugs and some of their attributes are presented in Table 1 .
Geographic areas
The price data from the Medicare website come in clusters of zip codes. Ninety zip codes were chosen by using a random strati…ed sampling, strati…ed to oversample zip codes that have a greater fraction of the population made up of elderly residents (individuals who are 65 years of age or older).
To see if there were any demand-side e¤ects on prices, we needed to ensure a su¢ cient variation in market size and other demand shifters, such as income, for discount drugs. The population of residents who are 65 or older in a zip code is a proxy for the local market size for cards, and the variation in Table 2 .
The program's price search engine listed prices for all pharmacies within a circle of a certain radius whose center coincides with the center of the selected zip code area. Depending on the radius of choice, this circle contains the pharmacies not only inside the chosen zip code area, but also ones in neighboring zip codes. The search engine allowed for a choice of 4 di¤erent radii for any given zip code, and these radii varied by zip code. For densely populated urban areas, radii tended to be much smaller, whereas for less densely populated suburban and rural areas, the radii were larger, so that card holders in these areas could obtain price information for a su¢ cient number of pharmacies within a broader driving distance. However, the program website did not provide any information on exactly how these radii were determined for a given zip code. We chose to collect price data for all pharmacies within the smallest and the second smallest radii around a given zip code. This selection of radii enables us to assess the sensitivity of our results on the average and the dispersion of prices to the choice of radius.
Timing of data collection
The price data were updated weekly on the Medicare website between May 29, 2004 and December 31, 2005. As shown in Figure 1 , the sample in this paper was collected for several weeks in order to cover important periods of time during which the MDDCP was in e¤ect. 8 The …rst wave of data was collected each week for a period of 7 weeks during the summer of 2004.
We refer to this period as the pre-switching period. The second wave was collected during the last week of December 2004. This week falls into the period between November 15 and December 31, which was the nationally coordinated switching period. Price observations from this period enable us to test whether card sponsors lowered their prices in an e¤ort to induce switches. Finally, the third wave was collected after the switching period was over, to assess the behavior of prices during the period when switching cards was not allowed. This period consists of 9 weeks of data. We label this period the post-switching period.
Each price observation pertains to a drug sold by a pharmacy at a given location under the discount o¤ered by a given card at a point in time. All retail prices pertain to a one-month (30-day) supply of a drug. The prices are posted prices, not necessarily transaction prices. Transactions may have taken place only at a subset of the posted prices, and some cards may have had no sales for some drugs.
Lacking sales data, we are unable to make any statements on these issues. No card sponsor imposed any explicit restrictions on the geographic variation in prices. The information that many national card sponsors provided on their web-sites (and in their brochures) allowed for price variation across pharmacies and over time. 10 Geographic variation may have occurred for several reasons, including the changing demand and cost conditions individual pharmacies face across locations or simply the changing composition of cards across locations.
Other price data
Part of our analysis aims to assess the magnitude of savings o¤ered through the cards by controlling for changes in the general level of drug prices unrelated to the MDDCP. Ideal control data for this purpose would be comparable pharmacy-level non-program retail price data collected at a weekly frequency to match the sample of MDDCP prices. Unfortunately, such detailed data are di¢ cult to …nd, and data available are very expensive. 11 Instead, we collected nation-wide wholesale prices for the drugs in our sample. These prices come from Mosby's Drug Consult (2004, 2005) , which lists prices for major drug wholesalers by dosage and duration. They are a representative sample of the wholesale prices typically used to reimburse patients on their prescriptions. 12 Unlike the card prices, however, these prices are not available by geographic units; rather, a single nationwide price is reported by each supplier (usually a manufacturer). In addition, the price quotes are not available at a weekly frequency. Instead, they are representative of the price levels that prevailed for the year the database was formed. Despite their shortcomings, these prices are the best readily available benchmarks and can be used as good approximations to compare discount drug card prices to regular prices consumers pay.
Another important issue is the identi…cation of program e¤ects. To attribute the evolution of prices to program-speci…cs, one needs to weed out the general trends exhibited by drug prices over the course of the program. For this purpose, we collected concurrent weekly prices posted by Internet drug retailers for the same drugs and dosages as in the program data. We used a major Internet prescription drug search engine provided by Destinationrx.com, which quotes prices from several Internet drug retailers. 13 There are eight on-line retailers in our sample. These are on-line stores of some major discount retailers (Costco.com and Walmart.com), on-line stores of some large drug retail chains (CVS.com and Walgreens.com), some specialized on-line drug retailers (RxUSA.com, Drugstore.com, and Homemed.com), and the pharmacy branch of a major health care service provider (AARPharmacy.com).
Unlike program prices, on-line prices exhibit no geographic variation. Because they are subject to general nationwide trends in drug prices, they can serve as a good comparison group for the prices posted by card sponsors. The purpose of this comparison is two-fold: First, it allows us to assess whether consumers would be able to obtain lower prices simply by purchasing on-line, rather than going through the process of choosing a card and hunting for lower prices. Shopping from on-line retailers is arguably a much simpler and more ‡exible way of obtaining drugs compared to the whole process of choosing a drug card that provides the best deal. Second, and more importantly, on-line prices can be used to control for general changes in drug prices unrelated to the program. Drug prices can change over time due to changes in manufacturers' costs, general in ‡ation, or other common factors. All such general trends would apply equally to MDDCP prices and on-line prices. Therefore, if di¤erent time patterns are observed for program versus other on-line prices, it is likely that program 1 1 For the entire set of zip codes, we were quoted a price of about $50,000 by IMS, Inc., a …rm that gathers zip-code-level price data from pharmacies. The …rm was unwilling to release any partial data at a lower cost for the smaller set of zip codes we use. 1 2 The nature of these prices are described in Mosby's as follows: "Prices are AWP (average wholesale price), a benchmark price used for reimbursement. AWP represents what a retail pharmacist or a dispensing physician might pay for a product, without any special discounts. There are, however, many discounts already in place, so the AWP can often approximate the price that a consumer might pay. The prices listed here are not intended to serve as an up-to-date substitute for supplier price lists. The price listings give the reader a good idea of the range between the high and low prices." For further information on the nature of these prices, visit http://www.mosbydrugs.com. 1 3 Once again, the data collection process was automated using IOpus Internet Macros that allowed periodical recording of the data from the website DestinationRX.com.
e¤ects are an important cause.
Analysis
We begin with an analysis of di¤erences in price levels in Section 5.1. These di¤erences result primarily from price di¤erences across cards, but a host of card characteristics and geographic area characteristics help to explain the di¤erences. Section 5.2 estimates the extent of savings that may be possible through the MDDCP. Section 5.3 focuses on dynamics, to see whether prices fell initially when consumers …rst chose their cards and during the switching period, and then rose in periods when consumers were unable to switch cards. The entire analysis of this section uses the second smallest radius for each zip code. The results turned out to be very similar when the smallest radius was used instead.
Analysis of price di¤erences
The starting point is to understand whether there was signi…cant price dispersion in the market for discount drug cards and, if so, what drove that dispersion. This …nding points to almost uniform pricing by cards across pharmacies and locations even though such uniformity was not explicitly guaranteed by any card.
To see whether the pattern in Figure 2 is typical of all drugs, we consider a general expression for the price p drcz of drug d o¤ered by card c at pharmacy r in zipcode z at time t
where is a constant, f i is a …xed e¤ect for i 2 fd; r; c; z; tg and e drczt is a zero mean error term that accounts for remaining unobserved factors. The contribution of each of the three main factors to the overall variation in price can be analyzed by using analysis of variance (ANOVA) to understand the components of variation in prices. Since pharmacies are "nested" within zipcodes, a nested ANOVA was performed to decompose the total variation in prices for each drug.
Results of ANOVA for the …rst week of data (June 21 to June 26, 2004) are shown in Table 3 .
The variation in price of any drug across cards is the major component of the total variation in drug prices. On average, about 87 percent of the total variation in price is explained by cards, and there is little variation in price within cards. The variations across zipcodes and pharmacies are usually dwarfed by the substantial variation across cards. The hypothesis that the average price of a drug is equal across cards is rejected strongly for all drugs. We repeated ANOVA for other weeks and the …ndings supported the same conclusions.
We also performed ANOVA for mail order prices for cards that o¤er a mail-order option. We expected to see zero variation in mail-order prices across zipcodes, as these prices, by de…nition, should be independent of geographic location, excluding any shipping costs. Indeed, the results suggested that the entire variation in the case of mail-order prices excluding shipping charges is attributable to the cards.
Geographic variation in prices
The …nding in the previous section that there is little variation in retail prices across zip codes opens the question of how much geography matters for pharmacies'pricing behavior, if it matters at all. By the e¤ect of geography, we mean the location-speci…c factors that may a¤ect prices, such as income level of residents, population, age composition in a location, which are particularly relevant as demand shifters.
It is important to be able to control for all other factors in investigating geographic variation in prices. The ideal experiment would look at the geographic variation in prices for a given drug- To obtain more insight, we documented the distribution of prices for major chains in our data.
Each panel in Figure 3 
Sources of price variation
While the analysis of variance in prices clearly indicates that much of the cross-sectional variation was attributable to the variation across cards, it does not provide information about speci…c factors responsible for this variation. Identifying key demand and supply factors that a¤ect prices is important for understanding why prices di¤ered across drugs, cards, pharmacies, or zip codes.
Consider the following version of (1) that includes explanatory variables explicitly for a given a time period t
where i is a K i 1 vector of coe¢ cients and X i is a K i N matrix of observables, for i = d; r; c; z:
Each X i has the form h x 1 x 2 : : :
where x j is a N 1 vector that contains variables speci…c to cluster j = 1; :::; K i within group i = d; r; c; z:
The structure of the error term in (2) is assumed to be
where e drcz is the error term in (2). The terms " i (i 2 fr; d; c; zg) represent the remaining unobserved part of the …xed e¤ect f i after the observable X i is added to the speci…cation in (1) to obtain (2).
Note that (3) implies that error terms are correlated within drugs, cards, pharmacies and zipcodes, due to the presence of cluster-speci…c errors " i (i 2 fr; d; c; zg). Since the unobserved components " i are …xed over time, we can include dummy variables for drugs, cards, pharmacies, and zipcodes to account for these unobserved e¤ects. Because these dummies absorb all the remaining …xed e¤ects, the error term (3) reduces to e drcz as in (1), and we can implement the regression in (2) without using any cluster e¤ects. 14 The results of the regression are shown in Table 4 for two speci…cations for the week of June 21
to 27, 2004. We used the same speci…cation for other time periods and the results were robust. In evaluating the results, it should be kept in mind that the drugs in our sample form only a small subset of all drugs (28 drugs out of more than 800) covered by the MDDCP. Therefore, some of the characteristics that would in general apply to the drugs in the entire list of the MDDCP may not be fully represented in this relatively small sample.
The explanatory variables, including the dummies, account for 98 percent of the variation in prices.
Given the large number of observations, all coe¢ cients are precisely estimated. Some of the coe¢ cient estimates are worth highlighting. Long-term, maintenance drugs in our sample are on average cheaper than the short-term drugs, based on the prices for 30-day supplies. This should not be taken as evidence of the cost-of-therapy being lower for long-term drugs in general, because long-term prescriptions are typically renewed for several months and some short-term prescriptions are prescribed for periods shorter than a month, such as some antibiotics (e.g., Zithromax) that are used for intense treatment for a week in certain cases. If the drug is used only 7 days, the cost of a therapy will be low.
Generic drugs and brand name drugs for which generic alternatives are available are cheaper, as might be expected. The prices are also lower for drugs that are prescribed more often. The drugs with expired patents appear to have higher prices, and those with an unexpired exclusive patent command even higher prices. In addition, newer drugs have higher prices, as indicated by the positive coe¢ cient on the year of approval by the FDA.
The coe¢ cients on selected pharmacy chains suggest that Wal-mart had slightly higher prices, by about 14 cents, than the omitted category of all remaining pharmacies, while CVS prices were lower by about a dollar. Eckerd, which merged with CVS in the spring of 2004 shortly before the MDDCP went into e¤ect, had prices that were higher by about 70 cents.
Turning to the card characteristics, cards with national coverage, with higher subscription fees, with a mail-order service and with a broader formulary tended to have higher prices. Cards that had arrangements to provide discounts with a larger number of drug manufacturers and cards that provided enrollment assistance had lower prices. It appears that certain quality dimensions, such as formulary breadth, extensive geographic coverage, and cost-reducing features such as association with a larger number of manufacturers, were important for the variation of price across card sponsors.
Characteristics of geographical, or zip-code, areas also in ‡uenced prices to some extent. Zip codes with a higher fraction of elderly in the population had lower prices. Zip codes with a higher median household income also had lower prices, while zip codes with higher housing rents were associated with higher drug prices. However, the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients for these variables are very small. As discussed earlier, much of the e¤ects of geographic control variables come from the changing composition of cards and pharmacies across locations. For instance, the observation that the zip codes with a higher fraction of elderly had lower prices implies that these high-elderly-fraction zipcodes attracted cards and pharmacies with lower prices, not because certain cards speci…cally charged lower prices in these zip codes compared to other zip codes they operate in.
Estimates of savings
The di¤erences in prices across cards found in the previous section raises the following questions:
Were the price di¤erences large enough to reward searching for lower prices across the di¤erent cards?
How big were the discounts o¤ered by the cards compared to non-card prices? Several small-scale studies tried to assess the extent of the discounts in the early phases of the program with only a handful of drugs and a few zipcodes. 15 Such investigations generally found some savings accruing to card holders, but the very small scale of these investigations prevented any general conclusions on the magnitude and extent of savings.
In what follows, we ignore the sunk cost (the enrollment fee) of card ownership and only look at the savings a card owner could obtain from using his card to purchase at card prices versus purchasing at regular retail or on-line prices. 16 To obtain estimates of savings we used regular drug prices reported by Mosby's Drug Consult database. De…ne p dt and p min dt as the average and the minimum of the 1 5 See, e.g. Antos and Ximena (2004) . Their approach is to …rst identify a few health conditions that are common in the elderly and then to calculate the total price of a bundle of drugs typically prescribed to remedy these conditions. 1 6 The enrollment fee was zero for many cards and could not exceed $30 under the program.
average price of a drug across cards in a given week t
Similarly, de…ne the average and minimum regular prices obtained from Mosby's (2004) database as
where i indexes the wholesalers listed in the Mosby's database for a given drug and dosage for a given year.
In addition to the prices in Mosby's database, a separate, independent source is the set of prices we collected from on-line pharmacies, as described earlier. Let p I dit be the price posted by an Internet retailer i for drug d at week t: Analogous to (5), de…ne the average and minimum prices for on-line retailers as p I dt and p
I;min dt

:
We now de…ne several alternative measures of potential savings. The …rst measure is the savings a "naïve" (or non-searching, or uninformed) consumer could obtain. A naïve consumer is de…ned as one who purchases randomly from one of the …rms with equal probabilities of sampling across available options in the market. For a single purchase of the drug at a given point in time, if this consumer uses a card instead of buying at the regular wholesale price, his saving is the percentage di¤erence between the average regular price and the average card price. We report the average of this saving across all weeks in the data in percentage form as follows
The second measure is the savings that accrued to a consumer, called a "searcher", who used the program website to search for the lowest price card for a given drug, but otherwise would have purchased randomly in the regular market due either to high search costs in the geographic market or to the absence of any comprehensive price listings for all the pharmacies in the consumer's geographic neighborhood. The savings of such a consumer is de…ned as the percentage di¤erence between the average price in the regular market and the minimum price in the discount card market averaged across weeks, and is obtained simply by replacing p dt in (6) by p min dt : The third measure we consider is the savings an "expert" consumer could obtain. An expert consumer is de…ned as one who is fully informed of prices in both markets and thus is always able to purchase at the minimum price. The average savings across weeks for such a consumer is formally de…ned as the percentage di¤erence between the minimum price in the regular market and the minimum price in the discount card market averaged across weeks, and is obtained by replacing p R d in (6) prices with respect to that of a naïve consumer who purchases randomly from one of the cards:
We can de…ne analogous savings measures by using on-line prices as a benchmark, instead of the Mosby's prices. The de…nitions of savings for naïves, searchers and experts can be easily modi…ed to obtain the savings compared to on-line prices by replacing the statistics pertaining to Mosby's prices with their on-line counterparts. In addition, we report for each drug the value of information for regular prices listed in Mosby's database and for the on-line prices.
The savings measures and the values of information de…ned above are reported by drug in Table   5 . First, note that the average savings compared to Mosby's prices were positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. A naïve consumer could obtain an average savings of 11.2%. The average savings were even higher for a searcher, about 25%. An expert consumer, on the other hand, had little to gain from purchasing in the discount card market: an average savings of only 2.3% accrued to such a consumer. Because most of the drug card users were most likely non-experts in search, the estimates of savings to naïve consumers, or at best to searchers, is likely to be the most reasonable estimate.
When we consider the savings with respect to on-line prices, a somewhat di¤erent picture emerges.
A searcher still could obtain an average savings of 16.3% by purchasing at the minimum card price instead of purchasing randomly from one of the on-line pharmacies. However, the bene…t for a naïve consumer was negative (but statistically insigni…cant), and an expert consumer could obtain positive (again statistically insigni…cant) savings. Thus, compared with on-line prices, card prices did not appear to provide substantial savings. Also the average value of information was the highest for regular prices, indicating the biggest rewards to search, with an average savings for an informed consumer that amounted to around 20% of the average price. These savings were followed closely by card prices. Value of information in the on-line market was the lowest.
Overall, the results indicate that cards could in principle provide some savings even to consumers who were not sophisticated bargain hunters, but such savings were not substantial. The returns to vigorous search across di¤erent channels of sale appear to be higher. The users of medicare search tools could expect to obtain some savings especially if they had no other means of search for lower prices in the regular retail market.
We do not attempt to draw any conclusions regarding the competitiveness of the three markets solely based on the value of information because markets di¤er, among other dimensions, in terms of the number of …rms and the degree of competition. The value of information depends on the number of …rms serving the market under many models of competition. 17 In addition, any welfare consequences based on savings would be misleading because consumer welfare does not depend only on prices. Finally, drug cards were heterogeneous in many dimensions, so a consumer was not likely to choose a card based solely on price.
Dynamics of prices
We now turn to the evolution of prices through the MDDCP. Price changes within two balanced panels of pharmacies from the pre-switching period and the post-switching period are examined in 
Results from the balanced panels
Using a slight modi…cation of (1), a price observation can be written as
where we introduced the interaction terms f ct , a card and time speci…c e¤ect, and f dt , a drug and time The speci…cation in (8) can be estimated using our unbalanced panel of observations. There are two drawbacks to this approach. First, there is a very large number of e¤ects (both pure and interaction e¤ects) to be estimated, which demands a large memory in any standard software. Second, and more importantly, the included e¤ects are not guaranteed to exhaust the set of relevant e¤ects which may lead to omitted variable bias, and the time-invariant …xed e¤ects can potentially be correlated with the error term. One approach to alleviate these concerns is to use time-di¤erencing, which gets rid of the time-invariant …xed e¤ects. Taking the di¤erence of the prices for two consecutive time periods t and t 0 we obtain
where
By …rst-di¤erencing in time, we get rid of all the …xed e¤ects that pertain to pharmacies, cards, drugs and zipcodes, and we are left with only the time e¤ects that we want to focus on. Note that di¤erencing works only if we have the exact same pharmacies across the two time periods. Therefore, we need to restrict attention to a common set of pharmacies (a balanced panel) across time periods. Now, consider the following regression based on (8):
where D ct , D dt and D t are dummies for the di¤erenced e¤ects d ct , d dt and d t . Starting with t = 1 and t = 2; we can take the pairwise di¤erences of average prices for consecutive time periods, and then stack them up on the left hand side to run the regression (11) and obtain the estimated coe¢ cients b ct ; b dt and b t which are the OLS estimates of d ct ; d dt ; and d t ; respectively. By the structure in (10), the error term drczt has serial correlation, which we take into account in estimating the standard errors.
Estimation (11) can be implemented for a balanced panel of observations. One problem with this approach is that the resulting panel has a low cross-sectional dimension if we restrict attention only to observations common across all weeks of data in the sample period. Due to DNS (Domain Name Service) errors that occurred randomly over time during data collection in repeatedly accessing the website, there was some random attrition in our sample and the balanced panel that can be constructed across all weeks of observation is limited in its size. 18 Because the attrition was entirely random across observations, there is no concern about a systematic bias in the sample. As a solution, we implement We repeated the analysis for the post-switching period using a balanced panel. The evolution of the prices in the sample of weeks from the post-switching period shows a very di¤erent pattern compared to the pre-switching period, as seen in the right panel of Table 6 . In fact, the estimated Speci…cally, the upper two histograms display the frequency distributions of the time-average of the card-time plus the pure-time e¤ects
for the pre-and post-switching periods, on the left and on the right panels, respectively. The bottom two panels contain the frequency distributions of the time-average of the drug-time plus the pure-time
for the pre-switching period on the left and the post-switching period on the right. The time-averaging reveals the average tendency of the interaction e¤ects within a given period. As evident from the histograms on the left hand sides of the upper and lower panels, most cards and drugs had lower prices on average during the pre-switching period. However, located in the right tails of these histograms, there were a few outlier cards and drugs that exhibited an average upward trend in prices even during this period. In contrast, for the post-switching period, all cards and drugs exhibited an average upward trend in price, as seen in the histograms on the right hand side of the upper and lower panels. Overall, these histograms suggest that prices of cards and drugs on average moved in the same direction within the pre-and post-switching periods with few exceptions.
We also repeated estimation (11) by adding a long-term drug dummy interacted with a time dummy to explore whether the long-term drugs exhibited any di¤erent behavior compared to the short-term drugs. In results not reported, we found that during the pre-switching period, the prices for the long term drugs actually fell less, and the post-switching period they rose less compared to the short term drugs. Overall, the long-term drug prices fell by an average of about $1 in the pre-switching period and rose by about $4 in the post-switching period. The fact that prices fell less for long-term drugs during the pre-switching period does not give support to the hypothesis that consumers searched more vigorously for bargains on these drugs. If this was the case, we would have expected to see a steeper decline for these prices compared to the prices of short-term drugs. One possible explanation for the observed pattern is that consumers with an existing prescription for a given long-term drug who have purchased from their preferred pharmacy for a long time may not have found it worthwhile to search vigorously for a card and pharmacy -which illustrates another form of switching costs.
The switching period
For the nationally coordinated card switching period that ran between November 15 to December 31, 2004, we were able to collect only one week of price data, due to technical problems we experienced in accessing the website repeatedly during much of that period. 19 We were able to collect data for only 15 drugs and the generally smaller number of observations for that period precludes us including the switching period in the balanced panel analysis of the previous section. Instead, we compared the average price level for each drug using two paired t-tests. For each drug, we perform two paired t-tests across common cards and pharmacies: one for the di¤erence between the week from the switching period and the last week of the pre-switching period, and the other for the di¤erence between the …rst week of the post-switching period and the week from the switching period. The paired t-test approach gets rid of the …xed e¤ects that are common across the two time periods and isolates the time e¤ects, just like the balanced panel used earlier.
As shown in Table 7 have also lowered prices in an e¤ort to deter consumers from switching. Thus, some of the observed 1 9 When the Medicare website was accessed repeatedly within a short period of time, a DNS (Domain Name Server) error prevented us from reaching the website. These errors were especially severe during the switching period because the format and the design of the website was changed, along with the location of the price data on the website (Overall, the website was redesigned 3 times after the initial release of the prices and we had to make the necessary adjustments to our web crawler software to accommodate these design changes). These changes made data collection more di¢ cult, resulting in a need to access the website more frequently over a longer period of time within a week.
price decline in this period could have occurred even before the switching period. We are more comfortable attributing the rise in prices after the switching period to the existence of switching costs, because during that period card enrollment probably di¤used to a large extent and enrolled consumers were committed until the end of the program. Even though we are unable to present evidence on the dynamics of prices either within or in the immediate time-neighborhood of the switching period, the pattern we observe for the periods at either end of the switching period suggests that prices generally fell during the switching portion of the program, especially in the initial phases, and rose later once the switching period was over.
In summary, the evidence from the balanced panel estimation and the paired t-tests point to initially declining but later rising prices, even though the magnitudes of change in price levels were not exceptionally large compared to the average price level across drugs. The pattern exhibited by prices lends more support to a model where prices move in a non-monotonic path, falling when consumers could switch cards and rising in periods when they are no longer able to switch cards.
Models suggesting a monotonic decline in prices due to enhanced consumer price information receive no support. Even though prices declined initially, they tended to rise later during the post-switching period. The observed patterns are broadly consistent with what one might expect in the case of dynamic price competition in the presence consumer switching costs, which are a crucial feature in the design of the MDDCP.
Evolution of non-program on-line prices
We now consider the evolution of on-line drug prices as a benchmark for the evolution of program prices. The basic idea for this comparison is simple. If the time e¤ects found in the evolution of program prices are speci…c to the program rather than being driven entirely by general trends in drug prices, the same time e¤ects should not emerge in the evolution of on-line prices unrelated to the program. To explore this, we consider a regression of the form
where D t is a time dummy, D i is a dummy for on-line retailer i; and D d is a dummy for drug d: The focus is once again on the estimates b t of the coe¢ cients of time dummies.
For on-line prices, we had few problems in data collection over time, so there is a larger number of weeks and the price changes can be observed with a higher frequency over a longer period of time, sometimes even more frequent than once a week. Table 8 presents the results of the estimation in (12) . The time dummies have almost uniformly positive and signi…cant coe¢ cients and the coe¢ cients are almost monotonically increasing over time. By the last week of data, prices were higher by about $3:39, controlling for vendor and drug …xed e¤ects.
We repeated the estimation in (12) using the total price (base price plus shipping fee) as the dependent variable and the results were very similar. The total price increased over time by about $3:53 and the estimated coe¢ cients were uniformly positive and statistically signi…cant in almost all cases.
Finally, we also used a balanced panel approach as in (11) and Atenolol had the largest drop (39%): Overall, the results from the balanced panel were similar qualitatively to the estimates of time dummy coe¢ cients in Table 8 .
The observed pattern for on-line drug prices thus indicates that the evolution of program prices was indeed di¤erent from the evolution of prices outside the program. On-line prices tended to rise over time, as opposed to the program prices, which …rst declined and then increased. Since on-line prices are subject to general trends in drug prices, but not to the e¤ects of the program, the patterns found suggest that the evolution of programs prices are indeed driven by program e¤ects, rather than by general trends. Two trends were especially important. First, on-line prices rose during the preswitching period during which the program prices exhibited a clear decline. The decline in program prices is consistent with the predictions of dynamic price competition models suggesting an escalated competition in the early stages of a market where sellers lower their prices to lure consumers. Second, the overall rise in on-line prices fell short of the rise in program prices during the post-switching period. Indeed, the program prices actually increased about $4 more than on-line prices by the end of this period. Therefore, the upward trend in program prices after the switching period cannot be explained simply by a general rise in drug prices due to non-program e¤ects. This "extra" upward trend is also consistent with the dynamic price competition models with switching costs, which predict higher prices when consumers are already locked in to their earlier choices and can thus be exploited by sellers.
Evolution of price dispersion
The analysis of the dynamics of price dispersion is equally important from a theoretical point of view. Did the prices converge when the general level of prices was falling during the pre-switching period, or when it was rising during the post-switching period? We measure the dispersion of prices as follows. At any point in time, we …rst calculate the average of a drug's price within a card. Then, we compute the dispersion of that average around its mean across cards. In other words, for each drug d and time t the dispersion measure is
where p dct is the average price within a card as also used earlier in (4). An estimate of 2 dt can be readily obtained as
; where
The stability of the variance over time for a given drug can then be tested using the hypotheses
H a :
; for at least one pair (t; ); 6 = t:
Under the assumption of the independence of observations across time periods, the set of hypotheses in (13) We used the balanced panel of observations for the …rst seven weeks to test the hypotheses in (13).
Bartlett's Test resulted in a rejection (at 5% or lower levels) of the equality of variances over time in 9 of the 28 drugs. Levene's Test, on the other hand, rejected the null hypothesis only for 5 drugs.
Thus, there appears to be no overwhelming evidence that the dispersion of average price across cards changed substantially during the pre-switching period.
We repeated the dispersion analysis for the post-switching period. Bartlett's test rejected the equality of variances over the 9 weeks for only 3 drugs. Levene's test rejected the null hypothesis for only 1 drug. Therefore, we found no strong evidence that the dispersion of prices was changing over the course of the program in a statistically signi…cant way. Thus, competition did not force prices to converge thereby reducing price dispersion.
There may be several reasons why prices did not converge. First, di¤erences across cards in their attributes certainly created some amount of product di¤erentiation. Product di¤erentiation may have led consumers to care not only about prices but other attributes of cards as well, allowing cards to charge prices di¤erent from each other. Because di¤erent card sponsors have arrangements with di¤erent drug manufacturers, cards' cost structures were also di¤erent -another source that can contribute to non-convergence of prices to a given level. Second, e¤ective consumer search is needed for convergence to take place, especially during the early phases of the program when card sponsors were lowering their prices and consumers were making their card choices. While there is evidence of search by card enrollees, the fraction of searchers does not seem to be overwhelming according to the available estimates mentioned in Section 2. Third, switching costs, by preventing allocation of consumers to low-price cards especially later in the program, could also have prevented convergence.
We also note that the initial decline in prices and the increase later on are not necessarily inconsistent with non-convergence of prices. Cards may have lowered their prices to attract consumers, but in the presence of product di¤erentiation and di¤erences in cost structure, cards' prices may have still di¤ered from each other, leading to persistence in dispersion. Similarly, when prices rose, cards'prices need not have converged to the same level, because high prices targeted by cards need not be similar,
given the di¤erences across cards. analyzed. The overwhelming fraction of variation in drug prices is attributable to the variation of prices across card sponsors, the primary price-setters within the MDDCP. We also found that prices were essentially uniform across individual stores of most retail pharmacy chains for a given card. Most of the geographic variation in prices was attributable to the change in the composition of cards and pharmacies from one location to another.
Cards o¤ered some savings to subscribers. During our sample period, a naïve consumer, who buys with equal probability from one of the sellers in a market, could in principle obtain an estimated average savings of 11.2 percent by using a card instead of buying at a regular price for our sample of drugs. However, naïve consumers were actually better o¤ purchasing from on-line retailers at nonprogram prices instead of purchasing using cards. The average savings were even higher (about 25 percent) for a searcher, who was assumed to be able to locate the minimum price seller for a drug across cards, but otherwise bought randomly like a naïve consumer in the regular market. providers will thus set prices for a broader horizon considering the trade-o¤s of charging lower prices to attract newcomers and higher prices to already committed consumers. Models of multi-period interaction between …rms, such as Beggs and Klemperer (1992) , suggest that such market growth puts downward pressure on prices, but prices are still higher than they would be without switching costs.
Such considerations were not present in the MDDCP, which lasted only for two years during which market growth was not substantial. These di¤erences between the two programs notwithstanding, in the light of the evidence from the MDDCP we certainly do not expect prices to decline secularly and the dispersion in prices to diminish over time. Rather we expect the Part D prices will follow a non-monotonic pattern, for similar reasons that MDDCP prices did. Table 5 . Estimates of savings from discount drug cards 4 "Expert" is defined as a consumer who is fully informed in both markets. 5 The figures inside the parantheses include shipping fees. The figures outside the parantheses are based on the on-line base prices.
A (*) indicates difference from zero at 5% or lower levels.
Savings (in %)
Notes:
2 "Searcher" is defined as a consumer who is informed of the minimum card price but otherwise purchases randomly in the regular market.
3 "Searcher" is defined as a consumer who is informed of the minimum on-line price but otherwise purchases randomly in the discount card market.
1"Naïve" is defined a consumer who is uninformed and purchases randomly in both markets. 
Regular versus card prices
